Inve Blog
Raw Material Pass-Through: Why Margins Still Swing
Management calls raw material costs a 'pass-through'—yet margins still swing 500 bps. Why copper, zinc and resin math fools percentage margins in India.
By Inve Research Desk · 16 November 2026
Published by Inve Research Desk
Edited & published by Aravind R · How this was written & verified →
On 29 October 2026, an analyst on a transformer maker's earnings call did a piece of back-of-the-envelope division that made everyone on the line uncomfortable. Shilchar Technologies had just reported a sharp second-quarter rebound: Q2 FY27 revenue climbed 43% quarter-on-quarter to ₹192.61 crore as deferred shipments cleared and North American exports resumed, and management reaffirmed its ₹750 crore full-year revenue target alongside an absolute EBITDA target of ₹200 to ₹250 crore (Shilchar Technologies Q2 FY27 concall, 29 October 2026). The catch sat in the margin column. For five straight quarters through December 2025, Shilchar's EBITDA margin had lived in a rich 28% to 33% band; then raw-material and freight costs stayed elevated, and the margin printed at 21% in Q4 FY26, 16.4% in Q1 FY27, and 20.8% in Q2 FY27 (Inve data and Q2 FY27 concall). Reaching ₹200 crore of EBITDA on ₹750 crore of revenue meant earning roughly 30% in the second half. Pressed by two analysts to reconcile that gap or state a margin figure, management declined to put a percentage on the table at all: "the margins will improve in Q3 and Q4. But I cannot tell you any numbers. I mean, it's difficult for me to even guess" (Shilchar Technologies Q2 FY27 concall).
We have misread this moment ourselves more than once when screening industrial stocks. You hear a capable manufacturer of transformers, cables, pipes, or specialty oxides say on three calm concalls in a row that copper, aluminium, zinc, or PVC resin is a "pass-through" to customers. You file the company away as insulated from commodity swings, model a steady percentage operating margin, and move on. Two quarters later, the metal spikes 30% — or drops 20% — and the reported margin lurches by 500 basis points anyway. The cost to an unprepared holder is buying a cyclical peak dressed up as pricing power, or panic-selling a perfectly healthy converter whose unit profit never actually broke. (Every company named here — Shilchar, Apar, KEI, J.G.Chemicals, and Astral — is an illustration of accounting and contract mechanics, never a recommendation to buy or sell.)
"Pass-through" is one of the most overworked phrases in Indian capital-goods manufacturers and industrial intermediates. Management rarely lies when it says the phrase. What it leaves out is that passing a rupee of input cost onto the customer protects rupees of profit, not percentage margin — and only after three very real frictions take their cut: the denominator illusion, the inventory-and-pricelist clock, and the contract book sitting between the factory and the buyer. Read those three mechanisms separately, and half the margin surprises in Indian industrials stop being surprises at all.
Why does percentage margin fall even when every rupee of cost is passed on?
Start with pure arithmetic, before a single customer argues about price. Suppose a neighborhood goldsmith charges ₹5,000 of making charges to turn ₹50,000 of gold bullion into a bangle. Revenue is ₹55,000, the gold cost is ₹50,000, and his gross profit is ₹5,000 — a neat 9.1% margin. Six months later, gold doubles to ₹1,00,000 for the exact same weight. The customer still pays for the gold in full, and the goldsmith still collects his ₹5,000 making charge without losing a rupee of income. Now read his new income statement: revenue has jumped to ₹1,05,000, profit is still ₹5,000, and his percentage margin has collapsed from 9.1% to 4.8%. His family eats just as well as before. Only a stock screener thinks his business deteriorated by half.
That goldsmith's shop is how every metal converter, conductor manufacturer, and oleochemical or oxide processor in India actually works. When raw material is 70% to 85% of the selling price and the company earns a conversion spread per kilogram or per tonne, inflation in the underlying metal bloats the top line (the denominator) while leaving the conversion fee (the numerator) unchanged. Reported revenue looks heroically strong on the way up, and reported gross margin versus operating margin looks mysteriously compressed — even when pass-through is instantaneous and 100% complete.
Why serious converters guide per tonne, not in percentages
Once you see the denominator trick, you understand why the best-communicating industrial managements refuse to play the percentage game. Look at Apar Industries, whose conductor division crossed ₹12,712 crore of revenue inside a record ₹22,902 crore consolidated FY26 top line (Apar Industries Q4 FY26 concall, 28 May 2026). On a naive screen, Apar's consolidated operating margin of roughly 8% to 9% across FY26 looks razor-thin next to a capital-goods peer printing 20%. Look at what management actually guides on the call instead: medium-to-long-term conductor profitability of ₹35,000 to ₹36,000 per metric ton (Apar Industries Q4 FY26 concall). That is the goldsmith quoting his making charge per bangle. If aluminium and copper rally 25%, Apar's revenue swells automatically, its percentage margin ticks down mathematically, and ₹35,000 per tonne of real cash operating profit remains ₹35,000 per tonne.
You hear the exact same separation on the calls of KEI Industries. After growing FY26 net sales 20.66% to ₹11,746 crore with an 11.81% EBITDA margin, KEI guided FY27 volume growth at 17% to 18% (KEI Q4 FY26 concall, 5 May 2026). When analyst Pulkit Patni asked what bullish copper prices would do to top-line growth, management stated the pass-through arithmetic in one plain sentence: "if the prices remains bullish of the metals, then definitely, the revenue growth will be much more" (KEI Q4 FY26 concall). Notice the discipline required of the investor listening in. If copper rises 20% and revenue grows 32% on 17% volume growth while EBITDA margin dips by 70 basis points, nothing broke; the metal just walked through both sides of the P&L. That is also why Shilchar's pivot on its October 2026 call — away from a historical 28%–29% margin band toward ₹200–250 crore of absolute EBITDA — is a critical signal to test: part of a lower percentage margin under high copper and CRGO steel prices can be pure denominator math, while another part is genuine unrecovered cost. Separating the two requires checking unit economics, not staring at a single ratio.
| What Copper / Resin Does | Revenue (Value) | ₹ Profit per Tonne | Reported OPM % | How Screeners Misread It |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spikes +30% (100% pass-through, 0 lag) | Jumps sharply | Unchanged | Falls (denominator swells) | Looks like "margin compression" despite flat unit profit |
| Spikes +30% (with cheap old inventory) | Jumps immediately | Spikes temporarily | Expands for 1 quarter | Mistaken for structural operating leverage |
| Drops −25% (with dear old inventory) | Falls immediately | Drops temporarily | Collapses for 1–2 quarters | Mistaken for permanent loss of moat |
| Steady metal, higher value-add mix | Grows with volume & mix | Rises sustainably | Expands durably | The only margin expansion worth paying a higher multiple for |
Friction 1: The 30-to-90-day inventory clock
Denominator math assumes the factory buys copper at 10 a.m. and sells the finished cable at 10:05 a.m. No real factory does. Between the purchase order for raw material and the invoice to a distributor sits 30 to 90 days of raw-material stock, work-in-progress, and finished goods in regional warehouses. That physical pile of inventory turns every sharp move in commodity prices into a temporary windfall on the way up and a sudden air-pocket on the way down.
Watch how the clock ticks in a channel business like plastic pipes or retail house-wires, which we unpack in more sector detail in how to analyse a cables and wires stock. When PVC resin or London Metal Exchange copper climbs steadily across a quarter, manufacturers revise their dealer price lists upward every week or two. The goods shipping out of the warehouse today are billed at this week's higher list price, while the accounting cost of goods sold (under FIFO or weighted-average costing) reflects resin or copper bought six weeks ago at a lower price. The spread widens automatically. Dealers see another price hike coming next Monday and rush to stock up, lifting volume right alongside the fat spread. Everything on the income statement glows at once.
Then the commodity turns down, and the film runs backward at double speed. Dealers stop ordering the afternoon they suspect a price cut is coming — why fill a godown at ₹100 when the manufacturer will revise the list to ₹92 in ten days? To clear shipments, the manufacturer cuts selling prices to match today's lower spot metal or resin, while its P&L must still expense the expensive inventory bought two months ago. Volume stalls and unit spread shrinks in the same 90-day window.
Reading inventory gains out loud on the concall
Good analysts always ask management to strip that inventory clock out of a strong quarter. Take J.G.Chemicals, India's largest zinc oxide producer, whose economics sit right on top of LME zinc prices because zinc ingots and dross are its primary feedstock. In Q1 FY27, consolidated revenue jumped 44.8% year-on-year to ₹315.7 crore and EBITDA margin widened to 11.5% from 10.64% a year earlier (J.G.Chemicals Q1 FY27 concall, 10 August 2026). On the call, analyst Harsh Motika (SKP Securities) went straight to the quality of that 11.5% print. Management's reply laid all three pieces on the table: "it is a function of operating leverage, it is a function of higher-priced and higher-margin orders, and plus a small amount of inventory gains which accrued during the current quarter" (J.G.Chemicals Q1 FY27 concall). One sentence, three forces — and only the first two repeat when zinc prices flatten out.
You see the mirror image in how Astral manages polymer cycles across pipes and adhesives, where quarterly consolidated EBITDA margins moved between 15% in Q1 FY26 and 20% in Q4 FY26 on ₹1,903 crore of fourth-quarter revenue (Inve data and Astral Q4 FY26 concall, 20 May 2026). Asked why the company was sitting on cash rather than deploying every rupee immediately, founder Sandeep Engineer pointed directly to polymer cyclicality: "if polymer is on a higher cycle and we can get at a cheaper cycle" alongside backward-integrating into CPVC resin by December 2026 to capture roughly 200 basis points of margin structurally rather than trading the resin swing (Astral Q4 FY26 concall). When a founder who has compounded through two decades of PVC volatility keeps dry powder specifically for resin troughs, a retail investor modelling a straight-line quarterly margin is ignoring the main rhythm of the business. The same feedstock-to-spread dynamic governs specialty chemicals companies, where a two-quarter feedstock tailwind regularly masquerades as a permanent step-up in specialty mix.
See it on a live earnings call
Browse AI-analysed concall summaries — guidance tables, graded Q&A, and the quotes behind them — for 1,500+ listed Indian companies.
Browse concall summariesFriction 2: Price-variation clauses versus fixed-price backlogs
Channel businesses reprice in days; order-book businesses reprice only if the contract lets them. Whenever an industrial company sells against a multi-quarter order book — transformers, extra-high-voltage cables, EPC substations, defence electronics — "pass-through" stops being an economic truism and becomes a legal clause in a tender document.
Every institutional contract falls into one of two buckets:
- Price-Variation Clause (PVC) contracts — typically signed with state utilities, Power Grid, or large domestic industrial buyers. The billing price adjusts automatically by an agreed index formula (such as IEEMA indices for copper, aluminium, transformer oil, and CRGO electrical steel) between the bid date and the dispatch date. Even here, pass-through is imperfect: the formula usually caps or lags freight, packaging, and shop-floor overheads, and it only covers the months inside the contractual delivery window. If a client delays lifting the transformer or a shipping crisis strands containers at port, unindexed costs sit on the manufacturer's P&L.
- Fixed-price contracts — common in short-cycle export orders, private-sector solar/wind balance-of-plant orders, and sub-contracts. Here the manufacturer either hedges the metal back-to-back on the LME/MCX the day the purchase order arrives, builds a contingency buffer into the quote, or swallows whatever copper and freight do before shipment.
Go back to Shilchar Technologies with that contract lens in hand and Q4 FY26 through Q2 FY27 suddenly makes complete mechanical sense. Shilchar draws 40% to 60% of its sales from exports, heavily skewed to North America, with a ₹550+ crore order book (Shilchar Technologies Q2 FY27 concall). When 50% US tariffs hit Indian shipments (later withdrawn) at the exact moment Middle East shipping routes jammed up — the same Red Sea and Gulf container crunch that forced KEI to route March–April Middle East cargo via Fujairah port and overland at elevated freight cost (KEI Q4 FY26 concall) — deferred dispatches collided with elevated raw-material costs. A contract price set months earlier cannot retroactively bill a buyer for an unindexed freight spike or a delayed container. "Pass-through" works across a three-year cycle; inside a two-quarter logistics and copper squeeze, the manufacturer bridges the gap out of its own operating margin.
Three concall checks that separate real pass-through from an excuse
Because every management calls raw material a pass-through when inputs rise, you need a falsifiable way to check whether the business actually possesses one. Across 24,328 management commitments tracked by Inve over 1,648 listed Indian companies, 16,842 are old enough to have had a later call on which they could resolve; 57.8% of that resolvable set were delivered as stated, while 2,271 — 13.5% of resolvable commitments, or 9.3% of all 24,328 tracked — were never mentioned again on any later call (Inve data, as of 2026-09-04). Margin commitments made during favourable input cycles are prime candidates to go quiet when commodities turn. Three checks keep you honest:
- Check gross profit per unit (or EBITDA per tonne) across 8–12 quarters, not OPM %. Whenever a company discloses sales volume in tonnes, kilometres, or MVA, divide operating profit by physical volume. If ₹/tonne holds steady or rises while percentage margin dips during a copper rally, pass-through is working and the screener is lying to you. If ₹/tonne falls alongside percentage margin, the company could not pass the cost on — competitors underbid it, or fixed-price contracts trapped it.
- Watch inventory days and receivable days together. A management claiming "smooth pass-through" while pushing high-priced stock onto reluctant dealers will show rising debtor days and swelling inventory on the balance sheet — the classic working-capital warning signs that turn a P&L margin problem into a cash-flow problem.
- Test symmetry on the way down. True pass-through cuts both ways: if customers absorb higher copper prices via an index formula, they also claw back lower copper prices two quarters later. Watch what management says when raw materials fall 15% and margin jumps 300 bps. A candid management (like J.G.Chemicals naming Q1 inventory gains) tells you part of the jump is temporary. A promotional management claims the windfall as "value-added product mix" — and then blames "raw material headwinds" twelve months later when the cycle mean-reverts.
How Inve tracks margin commitments across commodity cycles
Nobody holding 12 or 15 stocks has the bandwidth to pull four old transcripts per company and check whether last year's "sustainable 28% margin" quietly morphed into an absolute rupee target once copper moved. On each company's quarterly Concall AI summaries, Inve extracts every forward margin, volume, and per-tonne profitability statement alongside the speaker's verbatim quote, and grades analyst Q&A exchanges as Direct, Partial, or Evasive — surfacing moments like Shilchar's two Q2 FY27 margin exchanges where analysts pointed out the 30% second-half math and got no number back. Over time, the Promise Tracker pins each margin or EBITDA-per-tonne commitment to the quarter it was born and tracks whether later results delivered it, revised it down, or let it go silent, while the AI stock screener lets you cross-check operating margin alongside inventory days, debtor days, and cash conversion (CFO/PAT) across more than 5,300 Indian companies in one view.
Where this lens can mislead you
State the counter-argument at its strongest before you use this framework to excuse a falling margin. Sometimes a collapsing percentage margin is not harmless denominator math and not a two-quarter inventory lag — it is Chinese overcapacity, new domestic plants, or a lost tariff advantage permanently crushing conversion spreads. Across FY26 and early FY27, dozens of Indian cable, pipe, transformer, and solar-component plants commissioned fresh capacity simultaneously. If five competitors all add 30% capacity into the same tender pool, bidders give away their conversion margin just to keep furnaces and extrusion lines running at 80% utilisation. From the outside, in the very first quarter it happens, structural overcapacity and a temporary raw-material lag look identical in the headline OPM line.
Second, hedging creates optical noise of its own. A disciplined exporter like Apar that locks in LME metal and currency back-to-back on the day an order is booked can report temporary mark-to-market swings under "other expenses" or "other income" before the physical cable ships, distorting a single quarter's reported EBITDA even when economic spread is locked in. Finally, our parsed transcript record averages roughly four to five quarters of depth per company (4.18 birth quarters among companies with commitments, as of 2026-09-04) — plenty to spot a sudden change in how management frames its guidance, nowhere near a full seven-year commodity cycle. Always check five-to-seven-year annual operating cash flows and return on capital before concluding a business owns true pass-through power.
Frequently asked questions
What does raw material pass-through mean in stocks?
Raw material pass-through means a manufacturer can adjust its selling prices — either through frequent dealer price-list revisions or contractual indexation formulas — whenever key inputs like copper, aluminium, steel, crude derivatives, or PVC resin rise or fall. Complete pass-through protects a company's absolute rupee profit per unit, though usually with a 30-to-90-day lag.
Why does operating margin (%) fall even when a company passes on 100% of raw material inflation?
Because both revenue (the denominator) and cost of goods sold rise by the same rupee amount while rupee profit (the numerator) stays constant. If a product sells for ₹100 with ₹80 of copper and ₹20 of conversion profit (20% margin), and copper rises by ₹20 which is passed on in full, the new price is ₹120 with ₹20 of profit — dropping the percentage margin to 16.7% even though unit profit did not fall by a single paisa.
Why is EBITDA per tonne better than EBITDA margin (%) for commodity converters?
Percentage margins get distorted every time underlying metal or chemical prices swing, rewarding companies optically when inputs crash and punishing them optically when inputs rally. EBITDA per tonne (used by conductors, specialty oxides, pipes, and steel tubes) strips out the commodity price level and measures what the factory actually earns for converting one tonne of raw material into finished product.
What is the difference between inventory gain and structural margin expansion?
An inventory gain happens when input prices rise during a quarter, allowing a company to sell finished goods at today's higher market price while expensing cheaper raw material bought 45 to 60 days earlier. It reverses as an inventory loss the moment commodity prices fall. Structural margin expansion comes from higher-margin product mix, backward integration (such as making your own CPVC compound), or operating leverage, and persists even when input prices flatten out.
What is a price-variation clause (PVC) in an industrial order book?
A price-variation clause is a contract term — standard in utility and government tenders for transformers, conductors, and EPC work — that links the final billed price to published raw-material indices (such as IEEMA metal indices) between the bid date and dispatch. Unlike fixed-price orders, PVC contracts shield the manufacturer from multi-quarter spikes in copper, aluminium, or electrical steel, though freight spikes and client dispatch delays can still squeeze margins.
The next time a CEO assures an earnings call that copper or polymer volatility is "fully passed on," resist the urge to nod and move to the next line. Ask the goldsmith's two questions instead: how many weeks does it take for that pass-through to clear the warehouse and the contract book — and if I measure this business in rupees per tonne across a full cycle rather than percentage margin in a bull year, is the conversion spread widening because customers need its engineering, or shrinking because five new factories just learned the same trade? Answer that, and commodity noise stops looking like business risk.
Inve is a research and analysis platform, not an investment adviser. Nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Do your own research or consult a SEBI-registered adviser before investing.